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Against Relativism:
Restoring Truth in Writing
BARBARA COUTURE

In an essay on the relationship between relativism and rhetoric, Barry
Brummett argues that philosophical relativism is compatible with the practice of rhetoric. As Brummett tells us, "If truth for relativists is consensus or
agreement, and if rhetoric is the way in which agreement is secured, then
relative truth is the product of rhetoric" (91-92). To a relativist like
Brummett, the ethical purpose of rhetoric is simply "to work" as a tool to
persuade someone that an idea is consistent or inconsistent with a given
system of values; it has no inherent purpose to be "always fair, honest,
decorous" or to serve "dominant ideologies" (90). Brummett suggests that
rhetoric enables the practice of relativism asa metaphysics, a scienceoftruthseeking. He also presumes an altruistic end to the struggle for relative truth
through the practice of rhetoric. He claims "the rhetorical critic who is
informed by rela tivism is unavoidably a social critic, charged with demystifying
perceptions of the given and showing what is both relative and socially,
symbolically created about them" (93). For Brummett, the critic informed by
the power of rhetoric and the philosophy of relativism "intervenes not only
to change how the past was seen but to shape how the future may be
experienced" (93-94).
An assumption underlying Brummett's view of the social critic is that the
critic is "unavoidably" driven to suggest change for the better-what other
aim would there be "to Change how the past was seen" and thus "shape how
the future may be experienced," except to improve upon the current situation? Yet the practice of rhetorical relativism guarantees no reliable
standard for judging action; it merely provides a tool to distinguish a
difference between one way of seeing and another, a perception that left
unguided by some ethical stance could lead either to endless and unresolvable
bickering over which position holds greater value or to a truth accepted on the
sole basis of a rhetorical argument which proved most powerful. This vision
of truth-seeking and rhetoric declares endless agonism and display of rhetorical power to be the only means of dealing with the diversity of individual
practices and values. It is a vision tha t, if accepted, categorically dismisses the
idea that rhetoric and its practice in writing can lead us to a common truth.
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And consequently, I would argue, it is a view that divests both written
argument and literature of their ability to achieve an ethical stance. In this
essay I set out to restore truth-seeking in writing through extricating writing
from the philosophy of relativism and its corresponding rhetoric. I shall do
so by performing a critique of written arguments by two scholars who hold
that truth and value are relative in both written argument and literature.
In Plato, Derrida, and Writing, a study of Plato's and Derrida's views on
writing, rhetoric, and critical theory, Jasper Neel dismisses the relationship
of truth to writing. He distinguishes truth from writing by claiming that
writing is strong discourse and strong discourse is not truth but a critical
strategy; we need not mistake writing for truth and, further, in evaluating
writing we should not concern ourselves with it. In Contingencies of Value,
Barbara Herrnstein Smith tackles the problem from the other end; she
dismisses the notion of truth and reifies value in its stead. She claims that
truth-as it has been conceived philosophically as an absolute good-is
nonexistent; what exists is value, which is a function of exchange (that is,
something is gained in giving value to something else); the reason that
writing or anything else is valued, therefore, has no relation to truth, but
rather to what is secured by declaring it has value. Achieving truth is not
possible; rather, it is possible only to determine what is better or worse in a
given situation.
Both Neel and Herrnstein Smith extricate truth from writing and value
from truth, but in doing so they do not prove either that writing cannot be
truth or that truth is not possible. Instead, they interpret truth and writing
in ways that make them necessarily incompatible, a conclusion that is
justified by philosophical relativism. In presenting a case against their
claims, I offer first an introduction to the major arguments made by both
these theorists. I follow with a critique of the positions they share. This
analysis reveals that their vision of writing and truth is bolstered by three
questionable premises about the nature of truth in human experience:
• a historicist interpretation of human will as it is determined by ideology
• an essentialist interpretation of objective truth
• a fundamentalist interpretation of human activity as it progresses over time

In concluding, I suggest ways of looking at truth that can lead us away from
these perspectives to restore the possibilityoftruth-seeking through writing.
Neel's Rejection of Truth in Writing
In Plato, Derrida, and Writing, Neel attempts to create a morally defensible
role for writing through dignifying the aims of rhetoric while denying that
writing seeks truth. This stance shapes his effort to redeem writing as it is
accused of displacing truth in Plato's Phaedrus and of erasing it in Derrida's
critical theory. Neel argues that questions about meaning in language are
separate from questions about the essence of human knowledge, being, and
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behavior-that is, questions about truth in human experience. He claims that
the obstacle to an effective theory of writing and practice is the philosopher's
quest for truth, and he sets out to liberate composition studies-badly in need
of theory with practical implications-from the philosophical aims against
which Plato and Derrida assess writing. Neel characterizes the pitfalls of
giving in to a philosophical view of writing, one that measures its relationship
to truth, thus:
Writers who give in to Plato in effect cease to be writers and become philosophers on a
quest that ... requires writers constantly to admit abashedly that they do not know the
truth. Writers who give in to Derrida become philosophers who never finish unworking
all those discourses that conceal or remain ignorant of their own written rhetoricity; such
writers feel obligated always to work backwards in order to show that what would be
required to begin a discourse is already gone. (203)

Neel poses a categorical distinction between the aims of rhetoric and
philosophy and draws the conclusion that to have one is not to have the other.
At one point in his argument he concedes that this distinction is not a
necessary or even helpful one, noting that writers who are liberated from
philosophy "need the Platonic ideal, the notion of the forever-absent truth
toward which discourse moves" and "at the same time, writers need
deconstructive strategy to prevent discourse from presenting itself as the
truth" (203). But having made this concession, Neel chooses to recognize
neither Plato's nor Derrida's work as philosophical, work that in itself seeks
truth. In order to discuss Plato's and Derrida's contribution to explaining the
role of writing in conducting the quest for truth, Neel elects to interpret their
writing as purely rhetorical, a device for persuading someone to accept a
position. He thus renders irrelevant the success of their works as attempts to
seek truth, and, further, he interprets the search for truth in writing as
fruitless.
Neel's chosen perspective on the aims of writing is most evident in his
deconstructive analysis of Phaedrus. Neel asserts that Plato lied in writing
through making ambiguous the authorship roles of Lysias, Socrates, and
Plato. As the reader will recall, the claims which are made about writing in
Phaedrus are conveyed in the speech of Lysias and in the dialogue about it
conducted by Socrates and Phaedrus-a dialogue conceived and written by
Plato. Among the many controversial passages in this work is Socrates'
declaration that "nothing worth serious attention has ever been written in
prose or verse," which as Neel claims, "effectively excludes writing from the
highest forms of thinking, understanding, and communicating" (3). In
deconstructing Phaedrus, Neel exposes Plato's voice which lies behind the
words of Socrates, Lysias, and Phaedrus. He notes that Plato writes the
dialogue as if Socrates were living, and in it Socrates directs Phaedrus to carry
his message to Homer and other philosophers and speech writers who had
died before Socrates' time. This evidence and other details pointing to
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historical anachronism and an overtly fictional stance demonstrate that
"Plato is mounting an effort to destroy time by using writing to kill all the
voices of the past while at the same time using it to preclude its use in the
future" (NeeI7). The result is a rereading ofPhaedrus to cohere with current
rhetorical theory about the unreliable presence of meaning in texts:
Reread texts do not say the same thing over and over again. As we "begin" to (re)read
Phaedrus, having finally reached the end where true beginning begins, we can "begin" to
see the absences through which the text exists and Plato-the most influential writer and
sophist of all time-is caught stealing writing from us. (24)

It is with some delight that Neel catches Plato "stealing writing from us"
through deconstructingPhaedrus, but the discovery is a fairly hollow victory.
It is surprising that he does not draw this conclusion himself, given that he
devotes several pages to demonstrating how Derrida fails to deconstruct
meaning in Phaedrus by revealing "Plato's inability to control the signification" (197). Neel's claim of having "caught Plato stealing writing from us"
seems little different from Derrida's conclusion, as Neel interprets it, that
"Plato cannot simply present the truth in Phaedrus, or anywhere else for that
matter" (199). Deconstruction as an analytical tool reveals the potential for
multiplicity of meaning, but cannot support Derrida's contention that truth
is not found in writing nor N eel's concl us ion that PIa to steals wri ting from us.
Neel admits, in fact, that he has not proven the latter, yet he chooses not to
explore the consequences. For example, he notes that Plato's dialogue is
structured overtly to set up writing as a "corrupt" replacement for dialectical
speech, but at the same time this structure covertly redeems writing as the
preferred medium to pursue knowledge: "Structure is what remains behind
as the trace of the effort to create a place in which knowledge can come to
know itself and present itself to the world" (38). Then, as if disappointed in
an interpretation of Plato that celebrates writing as a means of preserving
knowledge, Neel adds, "I wish I didn't think Plato knew that" (38). To deal
with Plato's work as the trace of a progressive quest for knowledge would
require him to interpret Plato's writing as a means through which we might
seek truth in human experience. He concludes instead, "Plato wants to use
writing, rhetoric, and sophistry to destroy themselves. What he must leave
behind to do so, however, is writing" (23). True to his rhetorical stance, Neel
prefers to cast the fact that Plato leaves writing behind as Plato's mistake
rather than probable intention, reminding us that Plato held that "truth as a
possibility depends on the impossibilityoftruth's appearing in writing" (SO).
Thus, we learn that the goal to seek truth in writing is fruitless.
Having shown how Plato makes truthful writing an impOSSibility, Neel
proceeds to show how Derrida makes writing truthfully an impossibility. For
Derrida, writing is "recursive, repetitious, never finished, never present; in
short, an eternal differance" (Neel200); hence, anything written is a concealment of both truth and the continual play of meaning that is writing. Neel
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attempts to define Derrida's unusual terminology in a way that makes the
terms represent stages in an argument that reaches a conclusion. He does so
by showing "what each term 'indicates' about the process of writing, especially student writing" (142). In nine brief passages, each offering an
interpretation derived from his extensive reading, Neel defines presence,
transcendental signijied,the trace ,absence, and five other terms in the Derridean
lexicon. He concludes that though the terms certainly are different and point
to different ways of seeing, his definitions read "like a one-note samba, the
same term defined the same way nine times" (141). In each case, Neel finds
Derrida's notion of the infinite play of meaning in writing to be a terrifying
prospect for writing and specifically for writing teachers. He says, for
example, of Derrida's concept ofthe "transcendental signified" or the idea of
"meaning without a signifier,"
If Derrida is right, no such transcendental signified exists or could exist outside the

presence of God. Thus, when we tell our students to pick a thesis or to discover a central
idea and treat it fully, we merely exacerbate their fears of writing. They believe in selfpresence and the transcendental signified. Though perhaps not consciously, they also
know all to well that the more they write the less their own presence is self-assured and
the further the transcendental signified that would pin (or pen) down their meaning in
absolute clarity slips away. (150)

This lapse into uncertainty in search of the transcendental signified is an
undesirable state, Neel claims, because it leaves writers unable to assert
anything in writing; a representation can never produce the transcendental
signified, an absolute meaning or truth which Neel assumes is God. The only
way out ofthis situation of never being able to express an absolute truth, Neel
claims, is to liberate writing from philosophy-that is, from any concern with
notions oftruth conceived as absolute but unwritten (Plato), or as written but
indeterminate (Derrida). The goal that writing should achieve in truth's
stead is to produce "strong discourse," discourse that withstands "the scrutiny of public life" and leads "to a best choice at a given time, in a given place,
with a given set of circumstances" (Neel 208).
According to Neel, "any discourse that has been expressed publicly and
found adherents becomes strong" (208). And strong discourse is what
creates "critical truth" (209), the only truth available to humans. Critical
truth is quite simply that view which manages to survive when contested by
an opposing view. The only other kind of truth, the philosopher's truth, as
Neel would call it, is unknowable. Hence, writers who seek it "in effect cease
to be writers and become philosophers on a quest that will never produce any
inscription at all, a quest that requires writers constantly to admit abashedly
that they do not know the truth" (203). Neel outlines principles in the
practice of sophistic rhetoric that guide the practice of "strong discourse,"
among them a firm trust that "language has the power to fabricate what seems
to be realities and to generate belief' (207). The ''well-trained'' sophist, Neel
tells us, not only knows "exactly how any decision or action emerged," but
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also "knows both how to undermine such decisions and actions and how to
explain their effect on others" (207). Though Neel defends the practice of
sophistry through strong discourse as a means of developing an ethical self,
he chooses not to question the ethical value either of knowing how to create
the illusion of truth through fabricating ''what seems to be" a reality or of
aiming to know "exactly" how a "decision or action" emerges in order to
"undermine" it. The objective of strong discourse, as Neel defines it, is to
create the illusion of obtaining truth through developing a good argument.
This strategy amounts to conceding that writing expresses a kind offake truth
always already positioned for an imminent takeover by yet another fake truth
which is forever never the truth. Truth, the thing one is after in the first place,
remains unattainable after all, with writing left over to compensate for its
loss. But, as I hope to show, we need not accept Neel's compromise because
we can show him to have misconstrued truth as unattainable in human
experience.
The clue to Neel's singular perception oftruth in human experience lies
in his reported classroom experience of guiding students away from truthseeking in writing. Neel reports the frustrations of a female student faced
with writing a "balanced" essay on the topic of abortion. Her trouble is that
she already has a truth she believes about the subject: "abortion is wrong and
oughtn't to be allowed" (93). Neel claims that Plato's theory of dialectic as
working toward an unattainable truth leaves this student unable to write her
truth, even though it has an existence, unless she resorts to what Neel calls
"antiwriting" (93). The latter results in an essay in the required argumentative form expected by the teacher. He experiences a similar struggle with a
''young man planning to become a minister" (93) who was writing essays for
an honors composition class. When reading the text of Job for the first time
as an assignment for Neel's class, the young man found he could not make
sense ofit; the text simply did not jibe with sermons he had heard about it in
the past. Neel reports that he had several conferences with the student who
wrote several essays on Job, each of which "undid" the other (94).
Neel admits that he wished to force both this student and the female
opponent of abortion "to contemplate"when he assigned them writing tasks
which forced them to confront their accepted values-values with which they
felt secure and adequate. In each case, the purpose of the classroom writing
experience was "to change from the simplistic, fundamentalist 'delusion' of
adequacy to the self-dialectical, contemplative, (p)sophisticated [Neel's
term for Plato's version of dialectic] 'reality' of inadequacy" (95). This
approach is wrong, Neel concludes, since it leaves the students feeling as if
they have failed and the teacherwithou t acceptable student essays. To escape
the trap of condemning students to inadequacy, Neel concludes, one must
give up the idea that writing seeks truth.
It seems to me that Neel's students had difficulties precisely because they
already had given up the idea that writing seeks truth. Both students opted
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to deny truth-seeking by writing essays that, as Neel himself describes, could
be refuted categorically as not true or "that did not pretend to truth" (95).
Neither understood how to convey truth-seeking in writing, which is not to
believe that writing is truth nor to deny writing's possible truth, but it is rather
to understand how writing and writer can grow toward truth; it is to examine
truth through writing as a dynamic, organic, and developmental component
of human experience itself. Neel's approach to both students was, by his own
admission, to force them "into a Platonic frame of reference" (95) that
required them to search for unattainable truth in writing about topics that
they were not ready to investigate that way. At the same time, the students
thought they were supposed to write traditional essays which Neel claims he
did not expect. But, in fact, a traditional essay is what he did expect or wanted
to believe he could expect from having students engage in truth-seeking
through writing. As he admits, every time the student who aimed to be a
minister gave him an essay, he "gave him an A and then took the essay apart,
showing him in detail why it was not 'true'" (95). Unable to locate a presence
of truth either in the student's didactic declarations of belief, nor in his own
denial ofthose declarations, Neel is forced to conclude that a search for truth
has no truck with writing. And it is no wonder that his classroom experiments
with dialectic lead him to this conclusion.
In an illuminating essay on Plato's Gorgias, James L. Kastely remarks
that scholars, such as Neel, have repeatedly misunderstood the notion of
dialectic as it is presented in Plato's writing. Although his remarks specifically address scholarly readings of Gorgias, they apply to Neel's reading of
Phaedrus as well. Kastely concludes that the outrageous arguments presented by Socrates in Gorgias force us "to question Socrates, Plato, and
ourselves" (107). This condition of "questioning," he finds, is highly relevant
to the situation of dialectic. A misunderstanding of the role of questioning,
I believe, informs Neel's distaste for dialectic as a rhetoric for writing. Kastely
explains the role of the teacher in facilitating dialectic like this:
Being a teacher can no longer be read as a professional role that one assumes; rather, it
marks one of two positions in the dialectic. To teach is to question .... To fulfill one's
position as a teacher is to practice philosophy as rhetoric-to understand the particularity of the other member of the refutation (that is, to recognize the historical, passionate,
and rational elements of the other person as they have been brought together to
constitute an individuality), to be sensitive to the language and the commitments
informing that particularity, and to induce reflection on the language lived with and by
the other individual. (107)

Neel felt uncomfortable with the role of teacher imposed upon him by the
dynamic of dialectic, perhaps because he understood that role as one of
counterattack and not as one that required him "to be sensitive to the
language and the commitments informing that particularity" that marked
the other in his confrontation. To do so, would require some slippage on his
part, some uncertainty, some uncomfortableness, some letting go of the
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strangle hold he longs to keep on his truth. It would require him to practice
"philosophy as rhetoric," as Kastely tells us, rather than practice rhetoric
(that is, his version of agonistic rhetoric) as philosophy.
To seek truth must involve an open admission of uncertainty about what
to believe; the alternative is to stick with what we already know or exchange
that for a new belief. Neel's students chose the former alternative and would
do so again if confronted with his version of dialectic. A truth beyond what
they knew was simply unattainable because to obtain it they were forced to
give up values that they are not willing to surrender to an attack or to
substitute for another truth, one more acceptable to the teacher. The
collusion of rhetoric with philosophical relativism puts the students in this
predicament, leaving them powerless to discuss in writing the issues and
beliefs most meaningful to them. To do so would be to put their beliefs at risk
of being labeled merely an idiosyncratic representation of the truth-a
judgment relativists levy on every human claim to a philosophical principle.
This homage to relativism renders human judgment about matters of value
essentially irrelevant. As I show later, through questioning the stability of the
premises which underlie Nee!'s argument, rhetoric can be disentangled from
philosophical relativism, writing can be freed from the limitations of strong
discourse, and we can assume again moral responsibility for the truth of our
discourse.
Herrnstein Smith's Rejection of Truth in Human Experience
In Contingencies of Value, a critique of the notions of truth and value in art
and life, Barbara Herrnstein Smith attempts to prove not only that truth is
contingent on local criteria which we protect from surrender (whether these
be criteria for a well-formed argument, political action, or moral behavior),
but also that truth without contingency-that illusive unattainable truth of
Plato's speculation-does not exist. For Herrnstein Smith, contingent truth
is a reality we can and must live with because it is all there is. Unlike Neel,
Herrnstein Smith does not deal with how truth-seeking remains separate
from writing, art, or any other human enterprise. Instead, she tries to explain
how we came to believe that what we value is truth, separating this truth from
objective truth which simply doesn't exist. Herrnstein Smith demonstrates
tha t val ue is radically con tingen ton cri teria which are supported socially, and
she argues, as well, that so must be truth. She claims that since I am different
from you and always will be, what you value must be different from what I
value and always will be-"value is radically contingent" (30). By extension,
truth, which is after all what we believe to be behind value, is radically
contingent. In effect, Herrnstein Smith does not attempt to explain truth or
value but rather illustrates how our diverse claims about what we value in art,
writing, politics, or religion ultimately become separate truths which can
never be enfolded by one truth.
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In the initial stages of her argument, Herrnstein Smith tackles the
question of what really happens when a work of art or literature is declared
to have aesthetic value, that is, judged to be superior aside from "all other
nameable sources of interest or forms of value-hedonic, practical, sentimental, ornamental, historical, ideological, and so forth" (33). She deftly
illustrates that aesthetic value is seen to be non-contingent or devoid of any
economic utility simply because judgments in value "appear to reduce to
differences in the 'properties' or 'qualities' of the Objects themselves" (3940), an illusion which is maintained when members of a community are in
strong agreement. Herrnstein Smith explains this occurrence like this:
A co-incidence of contingencies among individual subjects who interact as members of
the same communitywill operate for them as noncontingency and be interpreted by them
accordingly. (40; emphasis omitted)

Hence, what is a contingent value quickly becomes seen as an objective value.
In a chapter on axiologic logic or the logic of philosophical judgments of
value, Herrnstein Smith goes on to explain how contingent value becomes
conflated with objective truth. Here she examines "Hume's Natural Standard" and "Kant's Pure Judgments" and concludes that logic about matters
of value inevitably comes down to contesting one person's authority over
another's. To concede a change in value would require someone to give up
authority. To declare a consensus about value is to assume that consensus is
good for everyone. She believes that "an ideally achievable consensus is not
only not good for everyone but tends inevitably to operate to the advantage
of the majority and those with de facto social power and to the disadvantage
of the more 'different,' 'idiosyncratic,' 'singular,' and otherwise innovative
and/or marginal members of any community" (72). The axiologic project,
then, even in its most democratic guise, always has "the contested legitimacy
of someone's evaluative authority" at stake:
Though not all the battles are fought out in drawingrooms or classrooms, they are
inevitably fought out in social arenas and along lines of authority and power defined by
social, institutional, and economic categories: age and gender, class and political status,
teacher versus student, censor versus citizen, bureaucrat versus artist, and producer
versus art distributor versus art consumer, and so forth. (72)

Battles about value shall continue for two reasons: first, because value is
radically contingent, the theme which Herrnstein Smith repeats continually
and demonstrates in every conceivable manner; and second, because there is
in the end no objective truth to which any value has a claim.
In short, all evaluations of all kinds are contingent, including moral
jUdgments. No evaluations operate autonomously, that is, bereft of any
influence from the conditions in which they are produced. As Herrnstein
Smith explains,
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Expressions such as "It is right," It is good," "Murder is wrong," and "Business is
business" cannot embody objectivist appeals in spite o/how they are being used because,
aside from how they are being used, there is no way for them to embody anything at all.
(89-90)

The essential good or truth of such claims is often based on their acceptance
as a norm and the resulting benefits to a community; as Herrnstein Smith
points out, it is often believed that "a community prospers ... in proportion
to the extent that its members have achieved consensus or that it prospers
more as communal norms become more uniform, coherent, and stable" (93).
However, the opposite is also sometimes believed; that is, communities
prosper to "the extent of the diversity of the beliefs and practices of its
members and thus their communal resourcefulness, and the flexibility of its
norms and patterns and thus their responsiveness to changing and emerging
circumstances" (93). Hence, Herrnstein Smith concludes that values and
truths, for that matter, are pretty much a relative thing; there is no bottom
line, no ultimate truth. The fact of this matter, indeed, is quite inescapable
and oppressive, as can be assessed from the tone of Herrnstein Smith's
concluding argument:
There is thus no particular single dimension or global parameter, whether "biological"/
"material" or "cultural"/"spiritual"/"psychological," with respect to which entities can
be tagged or tallied as, "in the last analysis," good or bad-profit or cost, reward or
punishment, pleasure or pain-for any subject or set of SUbjects, much less for man in
general. There is thus also no way for individual or collective choices, practices,
activities, or acts, "economic" or otherwise, to be ultimately summed-up, compared, and
evaluated: neither by the single-parameter hedonic calculus of classic utilitarianism, nor
by the most elaborate multiple-parameter formulas of contemporary mathematical
economics, nor by any mere inversion or presumptive transcendence of either. There is
no way to give a reckoning that is simultaneously total and final. There is no Judgment
Day. There is no bottom bottom line anywhere, for anyone or for "man." (149)

If the "bottom line" isn't, if there is no supreme value and no uncompromising truth, what is there? Well, what there is is our own personal standard of
truth which we establish according to criteria that, again, are personal and
have personal value. Truth is relative and relativism cannot "deduce or
demonstrate its own rightness" (183). Instead, relativism "recognizes ... that
'the way' will be perceived and pursued differently by each to whom it is
pointed out" (183).
Having accepted relativism as the natural state of things, we also have
accepted that value and truth are in constant flux and multiply various.
Forevermore, we must conceive of the "irreducibly various as irreducibly
various, and of the multiply configurable as always configurable otherwise"
(183). What keeps things in this state of constant flux is the fact that value
and truth are always relative to the conditions ofthe moment which affect the
cost at which they are purchased; things always change into something else
because we perpetuate an endless system of "(ex)change" (144), where, as
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Herrnstein Smith suggests, one good is purchased at the cost of another.
Hence, all human activity, including the desire to locate a value or declare a
truth, consists of "a continuous exchange or expenditure (whether as payment, donation, sacrifice, loss, or destruction) of goods of some (but any)
kind, whereby goods of some other (but, again, any) kind are secured,
enhanced, or produced" (144). She interprets truth as a real-world commodity constructed by individuals and groups and bought, paid for, and traded as
a way of maintaining integrity and authority.
In support of her relativistic philosophy, Herrnstein Smith creates a
Weltanschauung that is compatible with events as she has personallyexperienced them. She dismisses absolute truth and in the process resolves a
personal dilemma, a crisis of seeming inconsistency in her own action which
acknowledged her own diversity: she found that she had changed her mind
about something she had thought true in the past and had to justify why.
Herrnstein Smith opens her discussion of value with a recollection of this
personal dilemma, an account of her changed perception of the value of
Shakespeare's Sonnet 116. Reporting the history of her judgment of Sonnet
116, she claims,
For a long time, I didn't much like it at all. As a discriminating young snob, I was
predisposed to find the value of any poem inversely proportional to the frequency of its
appearance in anthologies .... So it stood until several years ago, when I was immersed
in teaching the plays, editing the poems and rereading the critics, and immersed also in
my own life and a second marriage-of true minds, of course, or maybe ... or maybe not.
And, at that point, I discovered an altogether different 116.... To be sure, the arguments
are frail and the sentiments false and strained: but this is nonetheless a powerful sonnet
because, among other things, that very frailty and strain and falseness are expressive of
what is strong and true, namely the impulse not to know, not to acknowledge, not to
"admit" what one does know and would wish to be otherwise. (6-7)

Herrnstein Smith creates a philosophy of value that allows her to reconcile
what appear to be incompatibly diverse evaluations, each believed with
sincerity by herself, and one replacing the other. She concludes her personal
parable with this assessment of her new evaluation of Sonnet 116: "A lovely
reading of the poem, I think ... when I believe it" (7). This personal tale
rationalizes Herrnstein Smith's assessment of value in two ways. First, it
defines value as a position, a stance, a reading at a point in time which has a
life or substantiality of its own that does not change. A value experienced at
a point in time shall forever differ uncompromisingly from some other value
for which it is eXChanged at some other point in time. Second, it defines value
as something that is true or not true, present or not present, advocated or
denied.
There is nothing in Herrnstein Smith's conception of value which
suggests that value is developmental, evolutionary, or even accumulative.
The possibility of viewing valuation as a continuing process instead of
reifying the separate moments in which value is exchanged is never explored
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overtly by Herrnstein Smith. Admittedly, she does narrate a series of events
in her own process of evaluating Sonnet 116, but she does not see these parts
as they contribute to a seamless whole. Herrnstein Smith chooses not to
acknowledge that she incorporated her earlier pejorative assessment of
Sonnet 116 in her later belief that its "frail" and "false" arguments serve
admirably to express the difficulty of being straightforward about what one
knows, the important meaning which she claims to have found anewwhen she
reevaluated Sonnet 116 in her later years. Her more recent judgment did not
wipe out or change her earlier belief: it subsumed it, incorporated it,
expanded it, and even blessed it; the seemingly diverse claims grew into one
complex evaluation. Yet the model Herrnstein Smith proposes to explain
these events does not account for them as a narrative of growth. It is the
choice not to view evaluation as a process that leads Herrnstein Smith to see
value and truth as local, contingent, locked into the framework of time and
place. It is what leads her to declare that diversity obviates truth and
contingency displaces universality.
Contingencies of Denial
To deny that anything but relative truth can be found in human experience
(as does Herrnstein Smith) and consequently that anything but relative truth
can be obtained through writing (as does Neel) is to deny the organic,
developmental, and evolutionary nature of all human activity. It is to
conclude that all human activity, including truth-seeking and writing, is
meaningful only in its singular moments, a conclusion that makes life akin to
a chess game in which one piece is continually poised to wipe out or replace
another in the next move. This is a very old and seductive idea; it is derived
from a limiting belief in three epistemological perspectives: ideological
historicism, essentialist objectivity, and temporal fundamentalism. In the
sections that follow, I examine Herrnstein Smith's argument that truth is
contingent and Neel's assertion that truth in writing is unattainable as they
are determined by these perspectives.
Ideological historicism
Both Neel and Herrnstein Smith hold deterministic views of history as it
determines ideology. This ideological historicism leads them to predict with
absolute certainty the future course of human activities and stalwartly to
deny other possibilities. For Neel, historicism refutes the power of the polis;
the hope of arriving at truth through discussion among citizens of the world
is virtually impossible. History demonstrates we have not arrived at truth
through argument in the past, and hence we cannot do so in the future. For
Herrnstein Smith, historicism supports and refutes her central thesis that
people and values are multiply various and ever-changing; in a world historically determined, variety may be sustained, but change is an illusion, as it but
marks the return to something prefigured by the past. For both of these

Against Relativism 123
critics, historicism is an ideological prerogative which corroborates their
denial of human growth.
Neel'shistoricismisdisguisedbyhiscontinuoustalkofdismantlingwhat
is fixed, of replacing supplements with supplements, old beliefs with new
beliefs, argument with counter arguments. Such talk apes the continual
movement of narrative and suggests an unpredictable future that overshadows the past. Neel even advocates narrative, the continual unfolding of
events ever new, as a credible alternative to the ideology of religious fundamentalism that marked his personal past. As he admits when telling of the
personal conflicts experienced by a student from a fundamentalist background who had trouble writing about these beliefs, Neel wanted the student
"to dismantle a world view from which I myself had 'escaped'" (95). But in
fact, Neel himself has not escaped from a world view which insists on a
prefigured future. Even in attempting to describe how Derrida's vision of the
apocalypse differs from that of his Southern Baptist tradition, Neel holds on
to the notion of a prefigured event moving toward a predetermined end.
Here is how he describes the apocalypse as explained in the religion of his
childhood:
This whole scenario is logocentric because in it Christ constitutes a beginning, an ending,
an absolute authority, and an origin of meaning. When Christ speaks, at least in the
Southern Baptist theology of my childhood, he speaks absolute meaning. In effect, what
he says goes-no equivocation, no ambiguity, no margin for error. In that scenario, the
trumpet on the last day needs no interpretation. (102)

In the fundamentalist interpretation of spiritual truth, the meaning was clear
in the beginning and remains clear in the end-nothing changes.
In describing how Derrida counters the foundationalist belief in the
certainty of meaning, Neel sticks to the same historicist perspective. Instead
ofthe Word which had a meaning at the beginning which will remain the same
at the end, there ''will always be the play of signification, as signifier refers to
signifier in an endless chain that never leads back to an origin" (103). Neel
consciously poses Derrida's vision of the endless "play of signification" as an
"apocalyptic" vision of another sort (103). Instead of fundamentalist belief
in an absol ute end dispatched by an eternal God, we now have decons tructionis t
belief in endless ends determined through eternal agon. Being uncomfortable with the ethical paucity of this perspective, he concludes that there is
purposefulness within this destiny of eternal contest. It is to express and
discern sophistic truth through the practice of strong discourse. The virtue
of strong discourse is its distinction as the loudest voice heard "in a cacophOnous plurality of other voices, many of which are also strong" (208-09). The
messianic vision of the fundamentalist is portrayed as false truth to be
overcome in this new vision of the apocalypse. For Neel, the false messiah
is the presence of a truth that silences other voices; this ''weak discourse ...
always presen ts itself in the guise of the messiah or the philosopher -king-the
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one who claims to offer truth but in fact supplies only the silence that must
occur when rhetoric, persuasion, writing, and sophistry, those most human
of things, have been precluded" (209). So, the possibility of a truth for Neel
shatters the possibility of rhetoric, and the possibility of rhetoric shatters the
truth. An apocalypse-historically determined-is at hand in either case.
Herrnstein Smith's historicism is also conditioned by belief. For her,
history of social class, family relationships, religious persuasion, and aesthetic training determine the future, endlessly maintaining diverse and
equally valid human perspectives. Her fierce individualism and egalitarianism drive this conclusion. Unwilling to believe that a single, final authority
born of human will resides with some one or some group and no one else
(individualism), she believes that multiple authorities determine history for
everyone (egalitarianism). There is no subject who wills absolutely for
Herrnstein Smith, because to recognize a subject who wills absolutely she
must recognize a subject to whom she might be subject.
Within the thralldom of history, Herrnstein Smith has no human contender. Though she rigorously argues that in a relativistic state of affairs
there is a subject who freely chooses, the facts of history that constrain that
choice are not free and are not unique, a condition which effectively negates
the possibility of free choice and an individual subjectivity. For Herrnstein
Smith, the subject may have a ''particular ... identity/economy/perspective,"
but this "individuated" state is "not in all respects unique" (175). For
Herrnstein Smith, there can be no transcendental objective reason that
justifies one subject's choices and "no other subject's choices" (178). Yet, the
individual'S choices are underwritten by something and if that something is
"not transcendental, then it must be historical, and if the justification is not
universal and unconditioned, then it must be restricted, partial, and local"
(175). In other words, conditions as they were, have been, and are right now
determine the things that will be, and they determine an individual's choice;
there is no choice without the conditioning of history and hence no truth
beyond what is already known.
Ideological historicism excludes the possibility of human will. It discounts the originary power of the human subject and hence the hope of the
subject attaining truth through lived experience. As Karl Popper maintains
in his critique of the role of the polis in an open society, historicism
obliterates responsibility for action in society. Plato's historicism bound him
to the view that "social change was degeneration" (Popper 16). In positing
the past existence of a perfect form of government, society, law and other
social systems manifested on earth of which such systems in the current world
are a degenera te copy, PIa to ul tima tely had to concl ude tha t change must halt
in order to prevent further degeneration. This belief in a disembodied
perfection in an irretrievable past makes human alteration of this ideal a
corruption to be stopped at all cost. A similar condemnation of human
activity results from the Marxist project, which Popper characterizes as a
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social science initiative driven by historicism. Popper holds that the social
science perspective fosters a kind of "methodological essentialism" (26).
The method by which one determines a social truth is to determine the nature
of what is to come based upon how one has named or interpreted events in
the past. If revolution in the past is named to have come about because of
class struggle, then this identified principle will determine the nature of
revolutions to come. Far from viewing truth as open or even shaped by
human will, the historicist perspective closes truth and takes it out of the
realm of human action.
Both Neel's and Herrnstein Smith's characterizations of truth corroborate the historicist perspective. For Neel, we who always already do not know
the truth will never forever find tru tho For Herrns tein Smi th, we who are preconditioned by history, economy, and social identity cannot discover anything, let alone truth, that goes beyond that conditioning. Both the everchanging "cri tical truth" which Neel claims to come abou t through con tin ual
questioning in writing and that ever-changing "relative" truth which
Herrnstein Smith claims guides our everyday behavior represent expected
fluctuations in a predetermined world of continual replacement ad infinitum
of "truths" by other "truths"-all historically determined. If truth has not
been manifested in the past or present, as they claim it has not, then it is
certainly unattainable.
Essentialist Objectivity
Both Neel and Herrnstein Smith conceive of truth as an object. For Neel, a
tendency to objectify truth surfaces most strongly in his argument that
sophistic rhetoric ought to replace Plato's favored method of argumentation,
dialectic. The italicized words in the passages from Neel's argument shown
below, for example, uncover his assumption that truth is an entity, an object
which Plato would have us believe cannot be acquired:
In this history [of Western thought rejecting sophistry], the True, the Beautiful, and the
Good come under bitter attack by the sophists, who believe, or at least dupe their
students into believing, that the True doesn't exist, and if it did no one could know it, and
if anyone knew it, what the other person knew would be incommunicable. (205-06;
emphasis added)
If permanent (or divine) truth exists, humans by definition cannot know it, nor can any
of their systems of communication convey it . ... (206; emphasis added)

Strong discourse, in short, encompasses Plato's dialectic by putting all received notions
in question and then seeking constantly for a better truth . ... (209; emphasis added)

In fact, he strongly opposes the possibility of conceiving of truth as anything
else but an object, stating that if truth is not an object, it is but an "opening";
to attempt to find it in writing is indeed hopeless:
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By "taking" Phaedrus as the source of the possibility of truth, not the closure of truth, ...
the writer can open the possibility of dialectic within the writer's own self. Rather than
a place or a destination, rather than the shelter of some closed and complete revelation,
truth becomes an opening. Any writers who agree to enter Platonic writing will find
themselves injust such an opening; thus, most struggle with all their might never to go
there. (82)

The only alternative to jumping into the "opening" which Neel projects as
Plato's "truth" is to write as a "psophist," Neers term for those who "present
any position [one chooses] as the closure of truth" (81). This unfavorable
alternative, which Neel attributes to Plato, is not noticeably distinguishable
from the "sophistry" Neel advocates in the practice of strong discourse. The
latter is more worthy presumably because it stands the test of public scrutiny,
the acumen of which-if we are to believe Barbara Herrnstein Smith-is of
relative value.
Neers belief that Plato's truth lacks the objective presence that Neel
longs for it to have is apparent in his analysis of a portion of Ph a edru s in which
Socrates speaks about truth, beauty and moral value; here's the text with
Neers highlighted phrases:
Lucidity and finality and serious importance are to be found only in words spoken by way
of instruction or, to use a truer phrase, written on the soul of the hearer to enable him to
learn about the right, the beautiful, and thegood; finally to realize that such spoken truths
are to be reckoned a man's legitimate sons, primarily if they originate within himself, but
to a secondary degree if what we may call their children and kindred come to birth, as they
should, in the minds of others-believe this, I say, and to let all else go is to be the sort of
man, Phaedrus, that you and I might well pray that we may both become.
(qtd. in Neel88-89)

Neel objects to this text because "the whole paragraph presents itself as an
emptiness waiting to be filled through the process of dialectic" (89), and,
further, the words he italicized-in fact, all nouns, verbs, and modifiers in the
passage-hide "an unending series of questions, uncertainties, replacements, deferrals, differences, and supplements" (89). He complains about
the uncertain meaning of words in themselves, apart from the context of the
narrative they develop. To define those italicized words, Neel says, would
open "an unclosable dialectic" (89). This activity somehow seems unnatural
and heinous to Neel, as well it should. It is certainly not how we go about
interpreting communication in our daily lives.
If we reject Neers tendency to treat the words of Socrates' speech as
separate objects, we see that the story told here is not equivocal, uncertain,
or deferential in anyway. Truth surely is not presented as an object, but just
as surely, it is not presented as an openingorvoid. Socrates'taleofhowtruth
about the right, the beautiful, and the good gets made is rooted in the very
concrete material of human flesh and the factual event of human growth.
Truth is born with man, learned by way of instruction, is passed on to others,
and grows in them as well in a continuous cycle of birth, growth, and
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regeneration: an endless, yet constructive, narrative. What could be more
common to human experience than this familiar progression? What could
be more certain then birth, growth, and regeneration? More substantial than
the reality of progress through learning? Neel's truth consists of continual
replacements and deferrals, whereas the truth Plato reveres is embodied in
the process ofliving and, being so, is as material and vital as the body of man.
Neel's truth-which he believes to be Plato's truth-is an abstract and
motionless entity, a mathematical place holder waiting to find its real object
or substitute. It remains the same, never changes, and never progresses. It
is an object never forever to be touched by man, yet always already to be
replaced by him.
Herrnstein Smith's objectification of truth is similar to Neel's, yet it is
motivated by her attachment to an economic model of value. For her, truth
is a good on the open market, subject to free exchange. This analogy forces
her to misconstrue the exchange of goods itself as the ultimate function of
human existence, obviating activity motivated either by self-conscious will or
disinterested altruism. A "good"-such as truth, for example-resists analysis and hence is affirmed only by what other good can be exchanged for it.
Herrnstein Smith describes the exchange of goods that establishes what we
value as follows:
Goods, either one by one or collectively (as in "the good"), are not reducible to anything
else in particular, such as pleasure, the enhancement of survival, or the promotion of
communal welfare.... The irreducibility is a function not of objective qualities but,
rather, of West em (perhaps human) thought and language within which "good" or some
counterpart term or set of terms [such as truth, we might surmise] operates conceptually
and discursively as a generalized positivity that can be locally specified but not further
analyzed: in other words, (one) "good" can only be exchanged for (an)other good, in
discourse and otherwise. (146)

Though Herrnstein Smith claims that the exchange of commodity for commodity in the search for value may be necessitated by limitations oflanguage,
she also suggests that in some essential way the exchange of good for good
simply defines all activity in human experience.
An exchange of good for good even explains altruistic behavior, according to Herrnstein Smith. To prove it, she argues against Bataille's attempt to
demonstrate that humans in some circumstances will pursue an "irresistible
impulse to reject material or moral goods that it would have been possible to
utilize rationally (in conformity with the balancing of accounts)" (Bataille,
qtd. in Herrnstein Smith 143). As she interprets Bataille, man's seeming
altruism is motivated economically because he willingly suffers loss or
degradation in exchange for an "ultimate value" (144) which is "the unlimited
exhibition of his irreducibly sovereign free will, his insubordinate subordination of matter to spirit, and thereby his uniquely and definitively human
transcendence" (144). In other words, man will suffer loss and degradation
to help others in eXChange for retaining the beliefthat humans are superior
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beings with the freedom to choose. Confident that altruism too is accounted
for in her system of exchange oftruth for value, Herrnstein Smith lapses into
absolutism, declaring that to conceive of all good in terms of exchange is not
only a Western phenomenon, but also "perhaps human" (146).
But her economic model is overly elegant; her singular motivating
metaphor of profit and loss assumes an economy that is driven by the
arithmetic of balancing accounts, an economic model whose simplicity
denies the realities of economic development in present-day society. The
words investment and growth appear nowhere in Herrnstein Smith's counterattack on critiques of utilitarian theories of value, yet they are central to most
modern economic theories. If Herrnstein Smith were to account for investment and growth in her model of value ascription, it would be difficult, ifnot
impossible, for her to limit her discussion to the simple arithmetic of trading
tit for tat, apples for oranges, value for truth. She instead would have to
examine truth and value not as goods, but rather as dynamic investment
processes in an all-embracing system with potential for growth-a system as
complex and organic as the human race itself.
In sum, both Neel's and Herrnstein Smith's characterization of truth as
an object to be continually replaced or exchanged is evidence of their
essentialist objectivity. As D.W. Hamlyn has explained this view in Metaphysics, a belief in objects or substances is necessary "to sustain our ordinary
talk of and belief in change and the identity over time which is the correlate
of change" (66). Yet an essentialist vision of truth as object cannot be
confirmed by empirical or other evidence. Nor can objective presence be
assumed for any other thing that we identify as a substance. As Hamlyn notes,
"philosophers who have [considered that] scientific views of the world give
plausibility to the belief that the best terms in which to speak and think ofthe
world are not those of substance, identity and change, but, for example,
events or processes" (66-67). Neel and Herrnstein Smith limit their discussion oftruth to the assumption of truth as an objective presence. To disprove
the presence of truth in human evaluation or in writing, they both demonstrate that it is not an Object to be found. It could be argued that their
essentialist rhetoric does not lead them to conclude objectivity is a metaphysical necessity, that is, an absolute quality of truth or anything else. But
it overtly does lead them to rely on objectivity as an "epistemic" or de dicto
necessity, that is, a necessity for the way they talk about truth (Hamlyn 79).
Such apparent essentialist objectivity not only limits their arguments but also
is an unethical practice in the public and private experience oftruth-seeking
as I shall demonstrate in my closing remarks.

Fundamental Temporalism
The third way in which Neel and Herrnstein Smith err in their discussion of
truth, value, and writing, is in their interpretation of human activity as
fundamentally cyclic over time. This belief goes beyond the imperative of
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historicism which limits the future to events prefigured by a past to suggest
that time itself has no forward direction, no aspect that marks events as
progressive. Without a conception of human experience as marking progress
over time, both theorists must reject the conclusion that events may occur
that define human activity as purposefully progressing toward an understanding of truth.
The textual examples I have cited earlier confirm that Neel defines truthseeking as the historically determined endless task of replacing a supplement
with a supplement, never reaching the truth. This view of truth-seeking is
similar to Herrnstein Smith's tale of the endless balancing of accounts.
Movement from one account to another is motivated only by what's better or
worse in a given situation; the sands of value shift as needed to maintain her
desert ecosystem of exchange. Both theorists have assumed not only that
human activity is historically determined, but also that it fundamentally lacks
direction over time. Their way of looking at time, truth, and events is
consistent with ancient metaphors of time and destiny that have both
dominated and constrained scientific explanations of natural events. As
Stephen Jay Gould asserts, time traditionally has been conceptualized in
terms of two controlling metaphors, the "arrow" and the "cycle":
At one end of the dichotomy-I shall call it time's arrow-history is an irreversible
sequence of unrepeatable events. Each moment occupies its own distinct position in a
temporal series, and all moments, considered in proper sequence, tell a story of linked
events moving in a direction.
At the other end-I shall call it time's cycle-events have no meaning as distinct
episodes with causal impact on a contingent history. Fundamental states are immanent
in time, always present and never changing. Apparent motions are parts of repeating
cycles, and differences of the past, will be realities of the future. Time has no direction.
(10-11 )

Employing both the temporal metaphors of the arrow and cycle to describe
a single ceaseless dynamic, Gould notes, can help one explain and interpret
the world as a system progressing toward an end while maintaining a singular
identity. But kept ever separate, these metaphors can prevent one from
interpreting change as growth (blind to time's arrow) and from interpreting
pattern as evidence of immanent identity (blind to time's cycle). Through
examining the writings of early geologists, Gould demonstrates how belief in
the ancient metaphor of time's cycle led them to interpret the earth as a
machine which regenerates itself, despite the lack of empirical support for
this notion; this theory was confirmed empirically at a much later date.
However, he shows further tha t this same belief in the cyclic na ture of even ts
over time led scientists to reject the possibility of unexpected catastrophic
events changing the direction of earth's geologic development, a theory
confirmed in later investigations.
Neel and Herrnstein Smith make the same error in discounting the
complementary conceptions of cyclic and directional time as did the early
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geologists cited by Gould. Both interpret events over time as an endless cycle
of exchanging supplement for supplement, good for good, truth for value,
and writing for truth, without possibility of intervention, catastrophic or
otherwise. They deny the possibility of directional change, maintaining that
human behavior will continue to reflect the same cycle of searching for truth,
yet getting nowhere. At best, men will be able to determine what is better or
worse at a given time, which is what they have always been able to do and will
do endlessly. The possibility of directional progress is absent in both
theorists' world views; hence, they fail to interpret the cycles they have
inscribed as having a purpose. For both, the endless activity they project has
no goal, but rather results in infinite diversity and plurality of purpose and
value. Consequently, it matters not whether relative truth A prevails over
relative truth B because the truth is fundamentally determined by the cyclic
event of one argument appearing more persuasive than another in a given
circumstance. The possibility of people behaving differently than this
pattern suggests is unthinkable because it is unthinkable either that events
may occur over time which would move them to behave otherwise, or that
they themselves can control directional progress. This interpretation of
human existence suggests there is no ultimate purpose to the public and
private experience of truth-seeking, a perspective that dismisses human
agency as a factor directing and enabling social change for the common good,
as I will show in the next section. As Gould concludes his tale of geologists'
struggles to interpret earth's past, we modern scientists have been "compelled to balance [this] dichotomy-because time's arrow and time's cycle
both capture important aspects of reality" (178). It is not the limitations of
either metaphor for time which prevent us from understanding reality, but
rather our failure to use these metaphors interactively to generate a vision of
the earth and our life that accounts for human progress. Here is where
relativism misses the mark.

The Truth about Writing and Truth
Jasper Neel and Barbara Herrnstein Smith do not find truth in writing
because they do not regard truth as in tegral wi th human experience. As I have
proposed, three rational assumptions deny the relationship. Ideological
historicism rejects the malleability of the future and denies the possibility of
human agency that both embraces and overcomes the past. Hence, truth
which has not yet been found is seen as unattainable in human experience
and, thus, in writing. Essentialist objectivity makes oftruth an exchangeable,
displaceable, replaceable object; it encourages the belief that observable and
discrete differences in individuals' values deny the possibility of a truth held
in common. Such a view of truth limits human discourse to continuous
position-taking, where belief in something now pre-supposes the replacement of a former belief ad infinitum, with no replacement ever having a claim
to truth and no hope of a truth encompassing all human activity. Fundamen-
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tal temporalism denies the possibility that human activity is evolutionary,
developmental, and progressive. It interprets the pattern of exchange of
value for truth as perpetual and purposeless, unable to move in a direction.
If human activity is directionless, then seeking the truth through writing is
essentially purposeless and merely substitutes change for progress, as one
discourse continually replaces another through besting an other. The hope
of bettering all through learning from the past and shaping the future is
absent in a world where progress has no meaning. To transcend the
theoretical limits of the relativist philosophy of truth represented in the
arguments ofthese scholars, we must recognize truth as integral with human
experience and hence potentially expressed through all human concourse,
and, thus, writing.
Ifwe resist relativism in the process of producing and evaluating written
discourse, we can restore the possibility of seeking truth through writing.
Resistance to relativism involves rejecting strong discourse, that method of
resolving difference through conflict and conquering. This is not an easy
task, as the rhetorical tradition ofagonism underlies the way we teach writing
and the way we have conceived of truth being found. (Indeed, it is so insidious
that, at present, discourse in writing often is not heard except through that
convention!) It is not possible to outline here a complete program for
coming to truth through writing without agonism. But I shall explore briefly
some possibilities that are open to us if we resist relativism and its champion
agonistic rhetoric.
Ifwe resist relativism, we can revise our notion of the competent author,
and consequently, the competent seeker of truth. Rather than viewing
neophyte or inept writers as unable to participate in public discourse without
disassociating themselves from the social, economic, religious, and familial
patterns that limit their written expression, we might view them as participating with us in a common endeavor to seek the truth. In this scenario, we as
teachers elect to overcome the limitations of our pasts which urge us to
conceive of student writing as a flawed representation of reality instead of a
genuine struggle toward truth. Rather than assuming that our responsibility
and, in fact, only choice is to teach students to communicate in the discourse
genres that have confirmed value in academe and the business professions,
we might examine how the ways they speak and write to us might shape the
way we write to others in both public and academic forums. And further,
rather than believing that only writers who produce a good argument which
stands up to scrutiny can articulate the public truth, we might believe that
good rhetoricians provide but one service in our collaborative struggle
toward truth through a variety of human enterprises. This, interestingly, is
the aim Neel wishes to achieve in advocating strong discourse-a "collaborative [classroom atmosphere] where the teacher plays the role of philosopher-king less and less and the role of discourse facilitator more and more"
(210). But his vision of a plurality of competing discourses in the classroom
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does not go far enough. It surely validates competitive vying for public
validation. But absent is recognition of discourse that does not meet this
ideal and acknowledgement that such discourse also participates in the
ongoing conversation which moves us together toward truth.
But to conceive of all discourse as participating in our mutual growth
toward truth, it is necessary to wrest from relativism our conception of truth
itself. Neither present as an absolute object nor embodied within a subject,
truth-we must find-is born of human interaction, the struggle to know and
understand one another and our environment, and the effort to better this
world which we make and makes us. Truth made live in human interaction
finds no victory in declaring an argument false, or its author a liar. Nor does
it deem necessary that we seek the final word, for such a concept is meaningless in the continual process of human discourse. At the same time, to
conceive of truth as born of in teraction is not to view tru th -seeking as the act
of floundering in a void without seams or structure. Our lives are not
seamless, nor endless; they are shaped by our friends, relatives, schools,
churches, homes, and nations, and their meaning is reflected in our decisions
and actions. The truth we seek through such interaction with others is subject
to memory and learning and opens us to the possibility of a better life.
Interestingly, Herrnstein Smith validates the role of prior experience in
determining human activity and even the individual's role in using that
experience to determine a course of action. She interprets societal and
individual practices as initiating in "the recurrent inclinations" of individual
agents themselves (162). Individuals' consistent "inclinations" to behave in
one way rather than another, she claims, "are the corporeally inscribed traces
of the differential consequences of their own prior and ongoing actions and
interactions" (162). But she, like Neel, does not confirm that common
purpose is engendered through such interaction. She chooses not to interpret action that moves beyond individual experience as evidence of a human
desire to achieve common understanding of our collective and personal
worth. And what implications has this latter perspective for how we write?
To seek truth in the process of interaction is to view writing not only as an act
of art or rhetoric, but also as an act of faith that this occasion for authoring,
reading, discussing, and evaluating will bring us to a better understanding of
who we are, what we want, and where we are going. The poem or novel then
becomes not the word that hopes to change us, but the scene for change
through us. The business report recommends not the ultimate plan, but the
place where we can begin planning. Such a perspective requires us to view
rhetoric and hence persuasion in a new way, one that conceives of its aim not
to create discourse that stands up to public scrutiny, but rather to create
discourse that inspires public action for the common good.
And finally, if we resist relativism, we can become engaged without
apology in the act of trusting human enterprise. We can trust that we need
not accept the pattern oflife as it has been lived as the pattern that determines
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our future. We can question whether systems we have in place to ensure
competing truths must continue to function to do so. We can claim finally
that life itself has some purpose and that it is what we hold in common-our
common aspira tions-tha t gives h umani ty expression. We can decide finally
that writing (like all of our discourse) is provisional, marking a path toward
the goals of our various enterprises and contributing to our common humanity, rather than bringing conversation to a halt in a final word that becomes
a final deed. And we can begin judging the written work of our students as
it aspires to be part of that conversation toward truth, rather than as it aspires
to win an argument.
Should we resist relativism, can we bring an end to the agonism that
characterizes public discourse on issues of importance to us all? Rather than
denying that possibility by pointing to the record of our past, we might hope
for change through imagining the consequences of denying agonistic rhetoric
in the future. We can project a process of involving individuals ina collective
public discourse that would avoid, for instance, the sorry display of agonistic
speech we witnessed in the televised senate hearings surrounding the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. Here, instead of a
meaningful quest for truth through human interaction, we witnessed a
display of competitive rhetoric. Could these proceedings have been different
if the truth to be found in human discourse and rhetoric was conceived of as
undetermined by historical constraint, unlimited to a single word or phrase,
and free to grow in the progress of human interaction? Could they have been
different if we did not assume that the truth of any speaker's words was but
relative to those nominal "facts" thought to be more persuasive? Could
anyone justifiably have accused either Professor Hill or Judge Thomas of
fabrication, thus categorically denying their personal differences through
declaring one's truth the victor? Could anyone justifiably have declared that
Professor Hill's remarks were delusional or hysterical, restricting her freedom to speak and think differently? Could anyone in good conscience have
dismissed Judge Thomas's nomination as social tokenism, thus denying his
contribution to the interchange that marks our collective attention to and
understanding of societal diversity in these times? What difference would it
have made if the Thomas-Hill debate was not a debate, but rather a true
hearing, received with full attention in the hope not of declaring a winner or
loser, but rather of exercising personal freedom, engaging in conversation
about our differences, and determining a direction for a continued quest for
truth through ongoing interaction? And how could a change in discourse
practices have achieved that end?
The change required, I believe, is to dismiss concern about speaking and
writing the truth and to begin speaking and writing in truth. To do so is to
assume a responsibility for discourse that goes beyond rhetorical relativism.
It is to treat rhetoric not simply as a tool for persuasion and critique, but as
the purpose of human enterprise, and, as such, reflective of our moral intent.
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To describe writing as it embodies human intent for the common good is the
challenge a rhetorical theory must address if it is to explain the truth of
discourse to ourselves.

Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan
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Kinneavy Award Winners Announced

The James L. Kinneavy Award for the most outstanding essay in volume 11
ofJAC was awarded to Patricia A Sullivan for "Writing in the Graduate
Curriculum: Literary Criticism as Composition." Professor Sullivan
received a cash award and a framed citation.
Joseph Petraglia received an honorable mention for "Interrupting the
Conversation: The Constructionist Dialogue in Composition" and also
received a framed citation.
The award is generously endowed by Professor Kinneavy, Blumberg
Centennial Professor at the University of Texas, and was presented by him
at the meeting of the Association of Teachers of Advanced Composition
at the CCCC Connvention in Cincinnati.

